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1 Introduction
Climate change is a relatively “young” international
issue with significant social, economic and political
ramifications.Although there is a wealth of policy-
relevant research on climate change written by and
for the environmental community, examination of
substantive linkages between climate and
developmental concerns is in its early days. The
contribution from Dr Pachauri, Chairman of the
Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange, shows
there is evidence that climate will have significant
developmental consequences for all, but especially
on themost vulnerable and for the achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Climate policies, in turn, will have to be
“development-led”, if they are to have any chance
of achieving the political support necessary for
implementation.
The purpose of this Bulletin on climate change
anddevelopment is to generate awareness of climate
change in the development community and to
catalyse discussions about linkages with
developmental policies, programmes and
international funding priorities. The 19
contributions to the Bulletin that follow, have been
prepared by leading development and climate
change policy makers, researchers and members
of the donor community from across the globe.
Collectively, their contributions set out to:
n look at the implications of the latest scientific
assessments of the causes and impacts of climate
change for development prospects in the
developing countries
n examine the substantive linkages, connections,
conflicts and institutional issues between key
development issues and climate change which
have implications for how climate change can
“fit” into development agendas, and
n focus on what lessons and insights development
researchers can provide that might be relevant
to climate change based on decades of
development theory and practice.
The contributions comprise shorter “think
pieces” with longer, more detailed overviews and
analytical pieces. Section 2 of this overview provides
a brief historical overview of the emergence of the
climate regime and provides a thumbnail sketch of
the main features of the political and institutional
response focusing on the 1992 UN Framework
Convention onClimateChange and its 1997 Kyoto
Protocol. Section 3 sets out anumber of key research
and policy issues that emerge from the Bulletin,
ordered to prioritise areas that need work most
urgently. The concluding section makes some
practical suggestions about what comes next for
the climate and development research agenda.
2 A brief guide to the climate
regime
2.1 Climate science: causes and impacts
The scientific assessment of the causes and impacts
of climate change has been undertaken by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC).Established in 1988, the IPCChas produced
three major assessment reports that have helped
policy makers understand that the Earth’s climate
system is the result of complex and dynamic
interactions between the Earth’s atmosphere,
biosphere and oceans, which human activities are
beginning to throw out of balance (see Pachauri,
this Bulletin).The IPCC reports have been subjected
to themost intense scientific scrutiny that any global
issue has ever received. But its findings have been
affirmed by the scientific community and by all
governments. Themain greenhouse gases (GHGs)
are carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxides
and industrial long-lived gases. GHGs have risen
considerably due to fossil fuel burning,
deforestation, livestock farming and other human
activities.All countries contribute toGHG emissions
by emittingGHG from sources and by sequestering
GHGs through their sinks, such as forests.
Industrialised countries are responsible for the
greatest share of past and current emissions, but
increased contributions fromdeveloping countries
are projected to match industrialised countries’
levels around 2020 (or around 2050–2070, if
historical emissions are included).
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR)
concluded that if current GHG trends continue, the
concentrationofGHGs in the atmosphere will double
by the end of the century. Under business-as-usual
scenarios, the Earth could see a rate of increase in
globalmean temperatures greater than that seenover
thepast 10,000 years (seePachauri).Resultant climate
impacts include sea level rise, changes in agricultural
yields (seeDevereux andEdwards), forest cover (see
Leach and Leach) and water resources (see Burton
andMay) and an increase in extreme events, such
as storms, cyclones, landslides and floods (see
Hamilton). These impacts will have adverse
consequences, including serious health consequences
(see Bloom), particularly for developing countries
and poorer communities, particularly women and
the vulnerable, as they generally lack the financial
and institutional resources necessary for coping or
adapting to shocks (see Bloom, Huq and Reid,
Denton, Agrawala,Hamilton andBurton andMay).
Although the IPCC has declined to define what a
safe level of GHG concentration in the atmosphere
should be, it has concluded that stabilisation ofCO2
concentrations at any level requires eventual reduction
of global CO2 emissions to a small fraction of the
current emission level.Mitigation has been the core
political issue in the early years of the regime and
resulted in theKyoto Protocol. But questions about
who should undertake further emission cuts, on
what basis and through what kinds of mechanisms
and actions, remain (see Pan, Denton, Humphrey,
Leach and Leach).
2.2 The international response: UNFCCC
TheUNFrameworkConvention onClimateChange
(UNFCCC) was negotiated between 1990 and 1992
against the backdrop of preparations for the Rio
UNConference onEnvironment andDevelopment,
which was meant to usher in a period of global
partnership to integrate environment and
development (see Bezanson, Kjellén). The
Convention establishes an objective, guiding
principles, commitments and institutional
provisions to help ground the international response
to climate change. Article 2 of the Convention
establishes an ultimate objective for the Parties:
stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
This goal emphasises mitigation (prevention of
GHG emissions) while also recognising that some
degree of adaptation (coping with climate impacts)
will also be necessary.
Climate negotiations were strongly influenced
by Rio’s North/South dynamics and the principle
of “common but differentiated commitments”,
which implies that because of their lesser historical
contribution to global environmental degradation,
and their current more limited resources,
international commitments by developing countries
to protect the global environment should be less
onerous than those taken by developed countries
and their achievement to be conditional on the
provision of technology and financial resources,
mainly Official Development Assistance (ODA),
from developed countries (see Huq and Reid,
Greene, Lamin).
Accordingly, nearly all of the commitments in
the UNFCCC are differentiated: more detailed
commitments have been taken on by a total of 41
developed countries that are listed inAnnex I of the
Convention (Annex I Parties).1 In terms ofmitigation
commitments, Annex I Parties are required to take
the lead in modifying long-term GHG emissions
trends by enacting policies and measures. The
Convention also includes aquantified aim for Annex
I Parties: to stabilise their CO2 emissions and other
GHGs at 1990 levels by the year 2000, which the
majority of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
failed to achieve.Tomonitor progress, Annex I Parties
have to submit annual GHG inventories and
implementation reports, called national
communications, every 3–4 years, to theUNFCCC’s
supreme body, theConference of the Parties (COP).
This information is subject to expert scrutiny in a
process called in-depth reviews, which provides
(indirectly) information about virtually every aspect
of a country’s economy as well as projections.
The termnon-Annex I Parties refers to 130 other
ratifying countries. The majority are developing
countries that negotiate as a bloc called the G-77,
whichChina formally supports. Increasingly,many
non-Annex I Parties neither see themselves, nor are
regarded by others, as developing countries, such
as Mexico and Korea, and countries from Central
Asia, such as Kazakhstan. The mitigation
commitments of non-Annex I Parties requires them
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to prepare inventories (not annually) and national
programmes addressing climate change, but without
specifying any specific reduction results or arresting
deforestation.
The Convention also contains financial,
technological and adaptation assistance provisions
mandating resource flows from the OECD
Development Assistance Community (DAC)
countries (listed in Annex II) of theConvention in
favour of developing countries. Annex II Parties
have commitments to providing developing
countries with “new and additional” financial
resources and technological assistance tomeet the
full costs of preparing GHG inventories/national
communications and the incremental costs of
implementing their other Convention commitments
(Huq and Reid, Greene, Lamin, Agrawala). Annex
II Parties must also assist developing countries that
are vulnerable to climate change impacts meet the
costs of adaptation (the Convention is ambiguous
about whether it is full costs).
Unlikemany development-orientated agreements,
the climate regime establishes heavy institutional
machinery to oversee the implementation of
commitments and to ensure that further action is
taken by Parties to respond to the latest scientific
and technical information. The main Convention
institution is the Conference of the Parties (COP)
which meets annually, is attended by thousands of
delegates and provides the chief political forum for
international discussions.Nearly 200 decisions have
been adopted by the nine COPs held to date,
addressing matters related to the implementation
and evolution of commitments, and increasingly on
issues relating toother policy areas such as theWorld
TradeOrganisation (WTO).TheConvention entered
into force in 1994 in record time, in part because of
swift ratification by theUSA.
2.3 Political developments and the Kyoto
Protocol
Negotiations to strengthen theConvention occurred
at a time when the USA was actively engaged in
climate issues and workedmultilaterally alongside
the European Union (EU). Although initially
cautious about climate change restraining economic
growth,developing countries recognised they would
be worst affected and broadly supported the EU to
fight for deep emission cuts by developed countries.
These negotiations led to the adoption by COP 3
of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
The Protocol establishes individual, legally
binding targets for Annex I Parties. These targets
are in the formof absolute national emissions caps
to be achieved from 2008–12, with a specific
requirement on Annex I Parties to have made
demonstrable progress by 2005. The targets cover
the six main GHGs from defined sectors and
sources. In addition, Annex I Parties are allowed
to count net sequestration from certain land use,
land use change and forestry activities towards
compliance withKyoto targets (Leach and Leach).
The Protocol also establishes a collective target for
Annex I Parties amounting to 5 per cent below 1990
levels in the commitment period 2008–12.
Annex I Parties may achieve Article 3 targets
through domestic policies andmeasures. They can
achieve compliance with Article 3 by making use
of three flexible Kyoto mechanisms: joint
implementation, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading. These
mechanisms permit countries to invest in overseas
projects that result in GHG reduction, or else buy
surplus-to-requirement quotas fromother countries
(Humphrey, Pan, Leach and Leach).
The inclusion of legally binding targets and the
Kyoto mechanisms necessitated consistent and
transparent reporting of GHG inventory data and
mechanisms-related transactions.This information
must be reported in detail and is subject to review
by internationally constituted expert teams who
can report any discrepancies and non-compliance
to the Kyoto Compliance Committee, a quasi-
judicial body that will oversee non-compliance with
the Protocol’s binding commitments.
One feature of the Kyoto Protocol which
distinguishes it from the Convention is the higher
profile given to issues concerning the economic
impacts of mitigation measures on developing
countries. These provisions were included because
many OrganisationofPetroleumExportingCountries
(OPEC) wantedminimisationof thepotential adverse
economic impacts (oil prices dropping) they might
experience as a result of mitigation policies being
implemented by Annex I Parties.
2.4 Kyoto and beyond
By saying “no” to Kyoto in March 2001, without
putting forward any alternatives and subsequently
downgrading scientific assessments carried out by
the IPCC and by USA research bodies, the Bush
Administration hoped to kill themomentum in the
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climate regime. Thus far, this strategy has failed.
By April 2004, over 120 countries, including all
major industrialised countries, had ignored the
USA by ratifying the Protocol regarding its
multilaterally agreed structure and approach as the
pragmatic (not perfect) way forward. In the EU,
the reductions demanded by Kyoto will come into
effect under EU law (whether or not Kyoto enters
into force), with emissions trading commencing in
2005 among 25 countries with amarket potential
estimated at 10 million euros per annum. Japan,
Canada, New Zealand and other OECD countries
are proceeding with Kyoto consistent national
implementation. Australia has stated it will abide
by its Kyoto target (even though the stance of the
current government, is to not ratify).
The USA has kept the Protocol from formally
entering into force by exerting pressure on Russia
not to ratify using inducements relating to energy
contracts and theWTOmembership.These actions
ensure that a degree of policy uncertainty remains
over the Protocol’s fate, however widespread its
appeal. Yet theAdministration’s essentially negative
strategy on climate change looks increasingly out
of touch.The tabling of over 43 climate-related bills
in the USA Senate since 2001 (including one that
would have established a domestic emissions
trading scheme consistent withKyotomechanisms
that failed by just 12 Senate votes), and themyriad
regulatory actions at the state, municipal and
sectoral level, indicate more widespread support
for action on climate than ever. This support is
coming not only from the litigation minded
ecological/social justicemovement that are getting
ready for class action lawsuits (see Pettit) but also
the traditional, rather conservative policy
community, as evidenced by the report on the
national security implications for theUSA recently
published by the Pentagon (see Rogers).
These initiatives will generate political
momentum, but given that theUSA is expected to
overshoot its Kyoto target (–7 per cent from 1990
levels) by something close to 30 per cent, it is
unlikely that the USA will come back into Kyoto
and/or a supplementary international agreement
before 2012. Strong USA domestic pressure and
international momentum for Kyoto is likely to lead
to theUSA enacting domestic legislation based on
the Kyoto mechanisms, which were modelled on
the USA sulphur emissions trading programme.
What of the developing world? USA insistence
that climate change does not merit loss of short
term, essentially unsustainable economic growth,
has generated anger and frustration, not copy-cat
behaviour. As the contribution by Pachauri in this
Bulletin detailing the assessment of adverse climate
impacts on India makes clear, the scientific and
local evidence of climate change consistent impacts
is now simply too overwhelming. And perhaps
because of that, the calculus ofmonetised costs has
shifted from centre stage in climate policy as human
impacts, loss of life and livelihoods, local migration
and the prospect of social unrest (seeRogers), begin
to enter policy-making radars (see Denton, Pan,
Leach and Leach, Kjellén). Whether entrenched
North/South dynamics will give way, so that
emerging social movements (Pettit) support
developing countries taking domestic action, rather
than demanding actions of others, remains unclear.
3 Research and policy issues
This Bulletin is intended to provide development
and climate practitioners with an opportunity for
mutual learning and to explore connections,
conflicts, and to think “out of the box”. For
guidance, the contributions are clustered and
sequenced so that they address four core sets of
research and policy issues.
3.1 Adaptation, development and funding
The first ten articles address the most urgent task
facing the climate and development community:
how will climate change impact on the most
vulnerable populations?What policy responses are
(in)appropriate?And what institutional and funding
arrangements might avoid the worst impacts and/or
enhance coping capacities?
The contributions discuss this by examining the
scientific evidence on the sectors likely to have a
disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations:
agriculture (Devereux andEdwards), water (Burton
and May) and health (Bloom). Because they have
rarely been addressed, the contribution by Denton
examines the gender dimension of climate impacts
on agriculture, water andenergy.These contributions
also have a geographic focus with Denton and
Devereux and Edwards focusing on Africa and
Pachauri andHuq andReid focusing onAsia, as these
two continents will carry the largest proportion of
the global population vulnerable to climate change.
Countries in other parts of the world are also
examined in the case studies describedby Agrawala.
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All the adaptation contributions make clear that
climate considerations will cost money and must
bemainstreamed into development. It is alsomade
clear that the necessary awareness, research, policy
tools and finance are not yet available or
insufficiently so for this to occur.The contributions
by Agrawala, Hamilton, Lamin andGreene all focus
on how adaptation will be financed.An important
point that is not made clearly here, however, is that
because climate impacts will be happening also in
the developed world (witness the spate of heatwaves
and floods in recent years in Europe), it is likely
that developed country governments will come
under pressure from their own citizens for
interventions (to, e.g. provide insurance for flood-
prone housing, when the commercial insurers
withdraw; seeHamilton).Additionally, having the
capacity and resources to cope does not
automatically mean people will actually be prepared
for adaptation any better than others with less
resources (seeO’Brien et al. 2004, comparing climate
adaptation in Norway andMozambique). Both of
these factors will likely lead to costs and transitions
in the developed world, the implications of which
are not being addressed in research.
Should climate adaptation be “folded into”
existing plans for improved development?On one
level the answer is yes.But there aremany problems
about what this actually means. This is because
climate research on vulnerability and adaptation
uses these terms in completely different ways
(O’Brien et al. 2004). Seeing climate change in “end
point” terms focuses attention on adaptive capacity
as the main determinant of ability to cope.
Developmental approaches, on the other hand,more
commonly see vulnerability as a “starting point”,
whereby vulnerability determines future adaptive
capacity. This viewpoint stresses “adaptation now”
(see Burton and May). The “end point” approach
tends to result in climate change being regarded as
an anthropogenically incremental add-on to (natural)
climate variability. This seems logical until, as
highlighted by Burton andMay, such an approach
also seems to go hand-in-hand with relegating
climate change to the level of an incidental
backgroundnoise, with tiny streams of funding then
being justified to cope only with the increment.
Huq and Reid, too, focus on how nuances of
vocabulary hide approaches with very different
political and financial outcomes: mainstreaming
adaptation into development is not the same as
mainstreaming adaptation funding, as the latter ends
up requiring existing sources of ODA to do a lot
more work.As Agrawala points out in his overview
of adaptation case studies of Bangladesh, Egypt,
Fiji, Nepal, Tanzania and Uruguay, existing ODA
funds are so much larger than available climate
funding.But use of existing funds for climate change
would conveniently take pressure off climate donors
to provide additional resources. It would also reduce
pressure on donors to change the application of
flawed concepts, such as incremental costs, which
were designed by economists to deliver “objective
and rational” ways to differentiate between “global”
and “national” benefits – a distinction which looks
increasingly archaic in the interdependent emerging
world order described by Kjellén and Bezanson.
Lack of sufficient public funding for adaptation
has led to exploration of insurance schemes (public
andprivate).The contribution of these to risk coping
strategies in developed and developing countries
is explored by Hamilton. She concludes, however,
that the current financial structure of the industry
does not make commercial insurance viable inmany
developing countries although micro-finance, an
option which has not been explored by the climate
community,might prove effective for many groups
(Humphrey 2004). On the positive side, greater
investor awareness of increased future carbon
liabilities is already making the financial services
sector a bigger player in advocating climate
mitigation.
A further theme highlighted by Bloom is that
our knowledge of poverty and major transitions,
such as HIV/AIDs, suggests that in some cases,
climate change could push certain societies or
regions “over the edge”, as successive shocks
combine with systemic weaknesses causing chronic
problems a society simply cannot cope with.
A final, clear theme that emerges is the need for
climate adaptation policies to be rooted in local
realities and concerns.As pointed out most clearly
by Scoones, one lesson frompastoral development
is that local communities will not wait for climate
impacts to strike, but will deploy traditional
strategies and invent new ones to cope with change
and uncertainties. The “management” of climate
impacts and policy responses needs to be squarely
rooted in these creative, adaptable and flexible forms
of self-help to avoid top-down policy determinism.
This sits somewhat uneasily with the insights
on donor proliferation and aid fragmentation
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highlighted by Greene in his article on possible
improvement of the delivery mechanisms and value
of climate finance. The research and policy issue
here is determining the degree of donor
coordination and the project autonomy necessary
to avoid the worst effects of proliferation, which
distort host country priorities and drain
administrative resources. Because climate finance
will involve flows through the Convention’s
centralised financial mechanism as well as through
bilateral aid, increasingly for locally determined
adaptation needs, tracking and making both sets
of flows as effective as possible, is critical.
3.2 Mitigation, livelihoods and sustainable
development
The second cluster of issues, touched on by Leach
and Leach, Humphrey and by Pan, examine ways
of integrating climate mitigation into increased
levels of sustainable development and sustainable
livelihoods.
Integrating multiple objectives is not a strong
feature of climate policy, which has tended to
emphasise targets linked to inanimate aggregates
(nations, gases, Kyoto units).As noted by Bezanson,
development policy has not improved, with the
emphasis on inanimate aggregates (countries, GDP,
income gains/losses). And Kjellén points out the
social dimensions of sustainable development and
globalisation have been neglected and are only now
moving squarely into the environment/development
agenda. Poverty and gender issues have also been
left on the back burner.
All three contributions concerning mitigation,
stress the need to put livelihoods (see Leach and
Leach), development benefits (seeHumphrey) and
basic human development goals (see Pan) as the
central focus of future abatement efforts. This
emphasis on trying to focus onmitigation in a way
that also builds resilience (social, economic and
environmental) is in keeping with the wish
expressed by Pachauri for the next IPCC assessment
report: to consider the nexus between climate and
development as well as between mitigation and
adaptation.The contribution by Humphrey focuses
on research issues that might assist (re)design of
emerging CDM markets so as to maximise
developing country gains, including whether
unilateral or South/SouthCDMprojects might prove
an attractive model. He also questions why more
multilateral forms of the CDM, reflected in early
portfolio approaches advocated by developing
countries, were rejected. Acknowledging that
carbon sinks are a topic of tense debate, Leach and
Leach stress the multiple social, economic and
environmental benefits which trees and forests
provide.
The contribution by Jiahua Pan sets down
markers for the hot research topic in recent years:
the design ofmitigation commitments, particularly
for major GHG-emitting developing countries. As
the second largest GHG emitter in the world (after
the USA), the question of what kind of
commitments China may be willing to negotiate
and implement is key to averting climate change.
Pan introduces the concept of luxury/wasteful
emissions and classifies commitments that are
voluntary (which translates as ones that must be
done), conditional (which need only be done if
resources permit) and obligatory (from a moral
perspective, and thus binding on developed and
developing countries). His piece is closely argued
and fascinating, layering moral notions withmore
pragmatic features that define a tailor-made
approach for China.
3.3 Participation, social movements and
political transformations
The third set of issues raised by the contributions
is that little work has been done on delineating the
possible impact of climate change on social
movements and their potential transformation of
national and international political landscapes (see
Pettit, Rogers and, to a certain extent, Kjellén.
Pettit starts by noting that the snail’s paceof climate
negotiations and their highly technical and overly
market-orientatednature,has led to activist frustration
(a point also made by Denton). The prospects for
international diplomacy to solve the problem are
described as “grim”. He argues that building on
decades of experience with socialandecological justice
movements,marginalised communities arebeginning
to demand action be taken to reduce the life-
threatening effects of climate change. In the last three
years (2000–2003) these emerging, and as yet, fairly
smallmovements haveorganised alternative summits
at COP meetings, involving farmers, fisherfolk,
indigenous groups, women, youth and the urban
poor. The key focus of their strategies is challenging
vested interests (such as multinationals) to get policy
makers to address the power structures that cause
climate change close to home.
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Whether thesemovements will take off and can
reconfigure global politics remains to be seen.
Increased impacts, such as famine and food
insecurity could swell the ranks of the urban poor,
lead to internal and trans-boundary migration and
thus lay the basis for increased crime, social unrest
and collective political action as highlighted by
Rogers. But climate impacts may be discrete and
difficult to disaggregate from natural variability,
limiting collective organisation (on the politics of
international development and inclusion, see
Houtzager andMoore 2003).Additionally, the effect
of mass social movements on local, state and the
international political scene on an issue like climate
changemay not be positive.This is because climate
change is one of the most technically complex
multilateral negotiations ever undertaken. The
regime is full of necessary jargon; it operates in real
time across multiple levels of governance and when
international meetings do occur, negotiations take
place round the clock.This is not the sort of domain
in which social justice activists thrive.Additionally,
it is not clear whether the present impasse on the
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol is the root
cause of climate activist frustration and would
dissipate once Russia ratifies and when the USA
gets back in the driving seat (as it will eventually
because the climate issue goes to the heart of its
economic and industrial policy).
Pettit also raises the issue of litigation strategies,
which provide amore focused, high media profile
way for “victim communities” to voice their
concerns.Again, the advantages and drawbacks of
litigation strategies as tools to effect behavioural
change by the defendant multinational or polluting
county, as well as to empower and/or provide
material gains to themarginalised/poor communities
plaintiffs, remain to be assessed.Certainly, outside
the domestic USA context, there is very little
research examining how communities view such
global litigation strategies before, during and after
the legal processes. Because litigation campaigns
are increasingly triggered by globally organised
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it is
important to know, for example, how cases have
been identified, financed and “sold” to the
communities concerned. Policy issues also arise:
what are thebroader resource allocation andpolitical
implications of international litigation when
compared withmore traditional forms of collective
political action? Would involving courts to settle
climate policy undermine existing political
accountability channels or enhance them?
The activist observation noted by Pettit, that the
prospects for international diplomacy are “grim”,
is not shared by Kjellén who argues that a new form
of diplomacy has emerged over the last 20 years
which is rooted in global interdependence;
ecological, economic and social, and which is
distinct from traditional diplomacy based on the
pursuit of sovereign interests (Hain 2001). The
emergence of legal concepts, such as sustainable
development which requires the consideration of
the needs of existing and future generations,
challenge profoundly the geographic and temporal
boundaries underpinning the concept of sovereignty
(Allot 1990, 2002).
The involvement of new actors (local
communities,NGOs as well as countries traditionally
marginalised in international politics such as the
least developed countries (LDCs) and the Alliance
of Small Island States) is also notable. Although
studies documenting the formal rules allowingNGO
access to international meetings abound, research
investigating actual practices of participation of new
actors (NGOs, marginalised countries and private
concerns) at the international level is still relatively
rare. International fora are highly diverse in their
practices, apoint madeby Kjellén when emphasising
the importance of personalities in certain stages in
effecting outcomes, sometimes easing, and
sometimes hampering, transitions. Yet, there is a
tendency in development circles to see the global
as one homogenous lump of remoteness.When in
reality, many international processes are far more
fluid in allowing new actors free reign to organise
events, networking and lobbying activities.
3.4 Mapping future development policy,
practices and discourse
The contribution by Kjellén about new forms of
diplomacy defining pathways to the future is a
natural transition to the final three articles by
Bezanson, Scoones andNewell.These contributions
are not blueprints in any sense. They share instead,
fromdifferent perspectives, the challenge of defining
what kind of development policy, practices and
discourses are needed to respond to lessons learnt,
emerging realities and new policy challenges, not
just in climate change but more broadly.
Bezanson lays down the need to question the
post-war intellectual architecture of development.
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He argues that we can no longer hold that
development is linear,measurable, predictable and
subject to the universal treatment of economic
theory; a point echoed earlier by Bloom and
reinforced by the people-centred vision of
development embedded in the articles by Denton,
Burton andMay and Leach and Leach.As economic
globalisation concentrates gains with the “haves”
– wherever they are – using North/South lenses
blurs realities, which are better captured by using
an excluded/included focus.
The obsession withmaterial gain cannot bemet
by economic “catch-up”. The market does not
deliver to all and ODA purses will remain
inadequate. Materialism also transgresses
sustainability constraints and in any case the “haves”
do not seem happy because materialism does not
address the cultural, social and spiritual dimensions
of development, which are increasingly driving
political action.Development “new style” will have
to emerge from understanding the implications and
opportunities provided by three core issues: global
interconnectedness, our ability to innovate and
transform and local initiatives by communities
asserting their voice and demanding accountability.
One possible benefit of the current turmoil is that
fundamental change often occurs in times of flux.
Progressive institutions have a leading role to play
in redefining the concepts and institutional
infrastructures needed for development.
Lessons from dryland management in Africa
provided by Scoones also point to the need for
development institutions to rethink their operations
to function better in a world where unpredictability
is the norm. Drawing on earlier work (Mehta et al.
1999), Scoones talks of the implications for
development thinking which require institutions to
shift, for example, from static, rule-based
environments where responsibilities are fixed and
clearly delineated, to an emergent mode where
institutional arrangements aredynamic,overlapping,
heterogeneous, socially defined and flexible. This
implies a shift in power in favour ofmultiple sources.
Because Scoones suggests that science cannot be a
final arbiter, there will be more disputes. Dialogue
will thus become akey method in reachingnegotiated
agreement. The future of top-down change driven
by centralised expertise appears limited.The vision
for development here centres, instead,onmore local-
level, integrated, participatory learning involving
sequential learning through trial and error.
It is difficult to argue against the need to make
institutions flexible, responsive to people andmore
adept at dealing with complexity and uncertainty.
What will these new institutions look like? How
will they work?Are there some already working in
this way? Also, settled rules are essential for
transparency, for generating expectations about
how processes work to enable more effective
participation and for agreeing boundaries.Research
to define how these considerations can be balanced
will be context specific, eschewing generalisations,
but is also likely to be more time consuming and
constantly in need of updating, and above all
responsive, to take into account unpredictability
and local activism.
The contribution by Newell explores head-on,
the challengemost germane to climate change and
development agendas: policy coherence and
institutional coordination. Climate change
highlights the unsustainability of fossil fuel business-
as-usual growth trajectories.Multilateral banks and
other international economic institutions have an
enormous emissions footprint. Their role in
supporting conventional development strategies:
funding large-scale coal, oil and gas plants, instead
of small-scale solar and other renewables,
demonstrates how vested interests continue to
dominate economic institutions that are supposed
to serve the needs of the poor. The resulting policy
incoherence cannot be addressed by old style
development, as this cannot tackle the root causes
and is reduced, instead, to incrementalist
interventions, which consistently skew benefits
towards vested interests serving the “haves”.
Although efforts tomainstreaming environmental
concerns into development have raised significant
policy integration challenges, effective responses
have been stifled by formidable vested interests.
Witness theWorld Bank’s negative response to the
independent review of the Bank’s operations in
relation to extractive industries, which recently
recommended the Bank develop a long-term plan
to cease lending and move to supporting more
environmentally benign and socially beneficial
projects.
There are positive signs too. The concluding
sentence in the contributionby Lamin in this Bulletin,
is apt. She writes the ‘effective integration of climate
change intomainstreamdevelopment activities both
within the EU and in partner countries remains of
essence and indeed the greatest challenge if current
IDS Bulletin 35.3 Climate Change and Development
8
efforts are to prove successful and sustainable in a
longer perspective’.Holdingorganisations to account
for pursuing development that skews gains
continually in favour of the “haves” and consequently
shifts theburdenof climate impacts to the vulnerable,
willbe an important step in the “joined-up” approach
topolicy now demandedby climate change. It is the
practices,policies anddiscourses to support thepace
of joined-up thinking and action that need to be
addressed. Success would ultimately be judged by
whether there was aneed for a separate climatepolicy.
4 What next for climate and
development?
Can climate and development policy be joined up
and realigned in time to prevent significant impacts
and to ensure adequate responses to the impacts?
What sort of things do we need to know to do that?
What sort of actions must climate and development
professionals do or refrain from?
A broad range of researchers in this Bulletin and
elsewhere have pointed out that the generally “top-
down” climate negotiations should be accompanied
by a range of actions, formal and informal, to engage
a broader constituency of policy makers andpublics
in future climate policy than is currently the case.2
The need to involve mainstream economic, trade
and finance ministries and the development
community, comprising donors, research institutions
and a broader range of stakeholders than
environmental interests is also abundantly clear.
One suggestion to galvanise greater engagement
is to bring together the climate community with
the development community. Although the main
UN agencies attend the COP meetings and these
provide a ready-made ongoing forum, few
development perspectives are present. The COP
may turn out not to be the right “policy space” for
catalysing this dialogue; the IPCC could play a part
but this may also not be ideal. A first step might
then be to think about what kinds of policy spaces
might be more constructive in enabling mutual
learning to support integration of environment and
development generally, before focusing on the
mainstreaming of climate change modalities.
Although aspects of the long-term and complex
nature of climate change are well researched, some
are not, i.e. how to deal with shocks, surprises, and
unpredictability. And in many instances, existing
research does not reflect well broader shifts in social
science thinking (Berkhout et al. 2003)Additionally,
there is still a fundamental lack of shared
understanding about: which actors, what policy
spaces and what kinds of knowledge should inform
the formulation and implementation of climate
policy.Although the development community has
done research in this area (seeEdwards andGaventa
2001; Cornwall and Coelho 2004), research on
global spaces (other than invited space created by
the usual development suspects) may be needed.
More thinking about how climate policy is
currently constructed, perceived and influenced
by various players is also critical in analysing factors
affecting the viability and success ofmainstreaming.
Much existing climate research, undertaken in the
late 1980s/early 1990s, predominantly by
environmental institutions, is now of limited value.
First, much of it is not based on recent scientific
understanding, suggesting climate change may be
abrupt and unpredictable (not gradual and linear).
Second, most of it does not take into account the
vast cultural, political and economic changes that
have occurred in the last decade (such as
globalisation, commitment toMDGs), which have
radically shifted actors’ perspectives.
A multi-disciplinary research undertaken by a
more geopolitically balanced coalitionof environment
anddevelopment research institutions that take the
changed understandings and circumstances we find
ourselves in today, will advance not only the specific
mainstreaming challenges facing the climate regime,
but also contribute to the broader challenge of
rethinking development.
Overview
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Notes
* Thanks are owed to many colleagues at the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS) and beyond in helping to
pull this Bulletin together. Mark Kenber and WWF
supported the idea for this Bulletin and provided financial
support for the Bulletin’s production costs. I also want to
thank all the contributors, especially from the different
research teams at IDS, for diligently taking time out of
hectic schedules to reflect, on my timetable, about the
implications of climate change. As a newcomer to IDS,
your support and encouragement has been much
appreciated.
1. Primarily, theOECD countries plus the former planned
economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
2. All of the following reports make this point in one form
or another: J. Aldy et al., Pew Centre, Beyond Kyoto:
Advancing the International Effort Against ClimateChange,
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